A monotone system of min-max-polynomial equations (min-max-MSPE) over the variables X1, . . . , Xn has for every i exactly one equation of the form Xi = fi(X1, . . . , Xn) where each fi(X1, . . . , Xn) is an expression built up from polynomials with non-negative coefficients, minimum-and maximum-operators. The question of computing least solutions of min-maxMSPEs arises naturally in the analysis of recursive stochastic games [4, 5, 13] . Min-max-MSPEs generalize MSPEs for which convergence speed results of Newton's method are established in [10, 2] . We present the first methods for approximatively computing least solutions of min-max-MSPEs which converge at least linearly. Whereas the first one converges faster, a single step of the second method is cheaper. Furthermore, we compute ǫ-optimal positional strategies for the player who wants to maximize the outcome in a recursive stochastic game.
Introduction
In this paper we study monotone systems of min-max polynomial equations (min-maxMSPEs). A min-max-MSPE over the variables X 1 , . . . , X n contains for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n exactly one equation of the form X i = f i (X 1 , . . . , X n ) where every f i (X 1 , . . . , X n ) is an expression built up from polynomials with non-negative coefficients, minimumand maximum-operators. An example of such an equation is X 1 = 3X 1 X 2 +5X two-person stochastic games with a finite number of game positions. The problem of solving these systems has been thoroughly studied [1, 7, 8] . If both min and max are disallowed, we obtain monotone systems of polynomial equations, which are central to the study of recursive Markov chains and probabilistic pushdown systems, and have been recently studied in [3, 10, 2] . If only one of min or max is disallowed, we obtain a class of systems corresponding to recursive Markov decision processes [4] . All these models have applications in the analysis of probabilistic programs with procedures [13] .
In vector form we denote a min-max-MSPE by X = f (X) where X denotes the vector (X 1 , . . . , X n ) and f denotes the vector (f 1 , . . . , f n ). By Kleene's theorem, if a min-max-MSPE has a solution then it also has a least one, denoted by µf , which is also the relevant solution for the applications mentioned above. Kleene's theorem also ensures that the iterative process κ (0) = 0, κ (k+1) = f (κ (k) ), k ∈ N, the so-called Kleene sequence, converges to µf . However, this procedure can converge very slowly: in the worst case, the number of accurate bits of the approximation grows with the logarithm of the number of iterations (cf. [3] ). Thus, the goal is to replace the function f by an operator G : R n → R n such that the respective iterative process also converges to µf but faster. In [3, 10, 2] this problem was studied for min-max-MSPEs without the min and max operator. There, G was chosen as one step of the well-known Newton's method (cf. for instance [12] ). This means that, for a given approximate x (k) , the next approximate x (k+1) = G(x (k) ) is determined by the unique solution of a linear equation system which is obtained from the first order Taylor approximation of f at x (k) . It was shown that this choice guarantees linear convergence, i.e., the number of accurate bits grows linearly in the number of iterations. Notice that when characterizing the convergence behavior the term linear does not refer to the size of f .
However, this technique no longer works for arbitrary min-max-MSPEs. If we approximate f at x (k) through its first order Taylor approximation at x (k) there is no guarantee that the next approximate still lies below the least solution, and the sequence of approximants may even diverge. For this reason, the PReMo tool [13] uses roundrobin iteration for min-max-MSPEs, an optimization of Kleene iteration. Unfortunately, this technique also exhibits "logarithmic" convergence behavior in the worst case.
In this paper we overcome the problem of Newton's method. Instead of approximating f (at the current approximate x (k) ) by a linear function, both of our methods approximate f by a piecewise linear function. In contrast to the applications of Newton's method in [3, 10, 2] , this approximation may not have a unique fixpoint, but it has a least fixpoint which we use as the next approximate x (k+1) = G(x (k) ). Our first method uses an approximation of f at x (k) whose least fixpoint can be determined using the algorithm for systems of rational equations from [8] . The approximation of f at x (k) used by our second method allows to use linear programming to compute x (k+1) . Our methods are the first algorithms for approximatively computing µf which converge at least linearly, provided that f is quadratic, an easily achievable normal form.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce basic concepts and state some important facts about min-max-MSPEs. A class of games which can be analyzed using our techniques is presented in Section 3. Our main contribution, the two approximation methods, is presented and analyzed in Sections 4 and 5. In Sec-tion 6 we study the relation between our two approaches and compare them to previous work. We conclude in Section 7. Missing proofs can be found in an appendix.
Notations, Basic Concepts and a Fundamental Theorem
As usual, R and N denote the set of real and natural numbers. We assume 0 ∈ N. We write R ≥0 for the set of non-negative real numbers. We use bold letters for vectors, e.g. x ∈ R n . In particular 0 denotes the vector (0, . . . , 0). The transpose of a matrix or a vector is indicated by the superscript ⊤ . We assume that the vector x ∈ R n has the components x 1 , . . . , x n . Similarly, the i-th component of a function f : R n → R m is denoted by f i . As in [2] , we say that x ∈ R n has i ∈ N valid bits of y ∈ R n iff |x j − y j | ≤ 2 −i |y j | for j = 1, . . . , n. We identify a linear function from R n to R m with its representation as a matrix from R m×n . The identity matrix is denoted by I. The Jacobian of a function f : R n → R m at x ∈ R n is the matrix of all first-order partial derivatives of f at x, i.e., the m×n-matrix with the entry ∂fi ∂Xj (x) in the i-th row and the j-th column. We denote it by f ′ (x).
The partial order ≤ on R n is defined by setting x ≤ y iff x i ≤ y i for all i = 1, . . . , n. We write x < y iff x ≤ y and x = y. The operators ∧ and ∨ are defined by x ∧ y := min{x, y} and x ∨ y := max{x, y} for x, y ∈ R. These operators are also extended component-wise to R n and point-wise to
It is the least fixpoint of f iff y ≥ x for every fixpoint y ∈ X of f . If it exists we denote the least fixpoint of f by µf . We call f feasible iff f has some fixpoint x ∈ X.
Let us fix a set X = {X 1 , . . . , X n } of variables. We call a vector f = (f 1 , . . . , f m ) of polynomials f 1 , . . . , f m in the variables X 1 , . . . , X n a system of polynomials. f is called linear (resp. quadratic) iff the degree of each f i is at most 1 (resp. 2), i.e., every monomial contains at most one variable (resp. two variables). As usual, we identify f with its interpretation as a function from R n to R m . As in [10, 2] we call f a monotone system of polynomials (MSP for short) iff all coefficients are non-negative. Min-max-MSPs. Given polynomials f 1 , . . . , f k we call f 1 ∧ · · · ∧ f k a min-polynomial and f 1 ∨ · · · ∨ f k a max-polynomial. A function that is either a min-or a maxpolynomial is also called min-max-polynomial. We call f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) a system of min-polynomials iff every component f i is a min-polynomial. The definition of systems of max-polynomials and systems of min-max-polynomials is analogous. A system of min-max-polynomials is called linear (resp. quadratic) iff all occurring polynomials are linear (resp. quadratic). By introducing auxiliary variables every system of minmax-polymials can be transformed into a quadratic one in time linear in the size of the system (cf. [10] ). A system of min-max-polynomials where all coefficients are from R n ≥0 is called a monotone system of min-max-polynomials (min-max-MSP) for short. The terms min-MSP and max-MSP are defined analogously.
⊤ is a quadratic min-max-MSP.
A min-max-MSP f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) ⊤ can be considered as a mapping from R n ≥0 to R n ≥0 . The Kleene sequence (κ
We have:
be a min-max-MSP. Then: (1) f is monotone and continuous on R n ≥0 ; and (2) If f is feasible (i.e., f has some fixpoint), then f has a least fixpoint µf and µf = lim k→∞ κ
Strategies. Assume that f denotes a system of min-max-polynomials. A ∨-strategy σ for f is a function that maps every max-polynomial f i = f i,1 ∨ · · · ∨ f i,ki occurring in f to one of the f i,j 's and every min-polynomial f i to f i . We also write f σ i for σ(f i ). Accordingly, a ∧-strategy π for f is a function that maps every min-polynomial f i = f i,1 ∧ · · · ∧ f i,k occurring in f to one of the f i,j 's and every max-polynomial f i to f i . We denote the set of ∨-strategies for f by Σ f and the set of ∧-strategies for f by
We drop the subscript whenever it is clear from the context.
Example 2.
Consider f from Example 1. Then π :
We collect some elementary facts concerning strategies.
Lemma 2. Let f be a feasible min-max-MSP. Then (1) µf
In [4] the authors consider a subclass of recursive stochastic games for which they prove that a positional optimal strategy exists for the player who wants to maximize the outcome (Theorem 2). The outcome of such a game is the least fixpoint of some min-max-MSP f . In our setting, Theorem 2 of [4] implies that there exists a ∨-strategy σ such that µf σ = µf -provided that f is derived from such a recursive stochastic game. Example 3 shows that this property does not hold for arbitrary min-max-MSPs.
The proof of the following fundamental result is inspired by the proof of Theorem 2 in [4] . Although the result looks very natural it is non-trivial to prove.
Theorem 1.
Let f be a feasible max-MSP. Then µf σ = µf for some σ ∈ Σ.
A Class of Applications: Extinction Games
In order to illustrate the interest of min-max-MSPs we consider extinction games, which are special stochastic games. Consider a world of n different species s 1 , . . . , s n . Each species s i is controlled by one of two adversarial players. For each s i there is a nonempty set A i of actions. An action a ∈ A i replaces a single individual of species s i by other individuals specified by the action a. The actions can be probabilistic. E.g., an action could transform an adult rabbit to zero individuals with probability 0.2, to an adult rabbit with probability 0.3 and to an adult and a baby rabbit with probability 0.5.
Another action could transform an adult rabbit to a fat rabbit. The max-player (minplayer) wants to maximize (minimize) the probability that some initial population is extinguished. During the game each player continuously chooses an individual of a species s i controlled by her/him and applies an action from A i to it. Note that actions on different species are never in conflict and the execution order is irrelevant. What is the probability that the population is extinguished if the players follow optimal strategies? To answer those questions we set up a min-max-MSP f with one min-maxpolynomial for each species, thereby following [9, 4] . The variables X i represent the probability that a population with only a single individual of species s i is extinguished. In the rabbit example we have X adult = 0.2 + 0.3X adult + 0.5X adult X baby ∨ X fat , assuming that the adult rabbits are controlled by the max-player. The probability that an initial population with p i individuals of species s i is extinguished is given by
pi . The stochastic termination games of [4, 5, 13] can be considered as extinction games. In the following we present another instance. The primaries game. Hillary Clinton has to decide her strategy in the primaries. Her team estimates that undecided voters have not yet decided to vote for her for three possible reasons: they consider her (a) cold and calculating, (b) too much part of Washington's establishment, or (c) they listen to Obama's campaign. So the team decides to model those problems as species in an extinction game. The larger the population of a species, the more influenced is an undecided voter by the problem. The goal of Clinton's team is to maximize the extinction probabilities.
Clinton's possible actions for problem (a) are showing emotions or concentrating on her program. If she shows emotions, her team estimates that the individual of problem (a) is removed with probability 0.3, but with probability 0.7 the action backfires and produces yet another individual of (a). This and the effect of concentrating on her program can be read off from Equation (1) below. For problem (b), Clinton can choose between concentrating on her voting record or her statement "I'll be ready from day 1". Her team estimates the effect as given in Equation (2) . Problem (c) is controlled by Obama, who has the choice between his "change" message, or attacking Clinton for her position on Iraq, see Equation (3) .
What should Clinton and Obama do? What are the extinction probabilities, assuming perfect strategies? In the next sections we show how to efficiently solve these problems.
The τ -Method
Assume that f denotes a feasible min-max-MSP. In this section we present our first method for computing µf approximatively. We call it τ -method. This method computes, for each approximate x (i) , the next approximate x (i+1) as the least fixpoint of a piecewise linear approximation L(f ,
. This approximation is a system of linear min-max-polynomials where all coefficients of monomials of degree 1 are non-negative. Here, we call such a system a monotone linear min-maxsystem (min-max-MLS for short). Note that a min-max-MLS f is not necessarily a minmax-MSP, since negative coefficients of monomials of degree 0 are allowed, e.g. the min-max-MLS f (x 1 ) = x 1 − 1 is not a min-max-MSP.
In [8] a min-max-MLS f is considered as a system of equations (called system of rational equations in [8] ) which we denote by X = f (X) in vector form. We identify a min-max-MLS f with its interpretation as a function from R n to R n (R denotes the complete lattice R ∪ {−∞, ∞}). Since f is monotone on R n , it has a least fixpoint µf ∈ R n which can be computed using the strategy improvement algorithm from [8] .
We now define the min-max-MLS L(f , y), a piecewise linear approximation of f at y. As a first step, let us consider a monotone polynomial f : R n ≥0 → R ≥0 . Given some approximate y ∈ R n ≥0 , a linear approximation L(f, y) : R n → R of f at y is given by the first order Taylor approximation at y, i.e.,
This is precisely the linear approximation which is used for Newton's method. Now consider a max-
. We emphasize that in this case, L(f, y) is in general not a linear function but a linear max-polynomial. Accordingly, for a min-
⊤ which is a min-max-MLS.
≥0 which gives us, for an approximate x (i) , the next approximate
Observe that L(f , x) ∨ x is still a min-max-MLS (at least after introducing auxiliary variables in order to eliminate components which contain ∨-and ∧-operators).
Example 5. In Example 4 we have:
We collect basic properties of N f in the following lemma:
In particular Lemma 3 implies that the least fixpoint of N f is equal to the least fixpoint of f . Moreover, iteration based on N f is at least as fast as Kleene iteration. We therefore use this operator for computing approximates to the least fixpoint. Formally, we define:
for k ∈ N the τ -sequence for f . We drop the subscript if it is clear from the context.
is monotonically increasing, bounded from above by µf , and converges to µf . Moreover,
We now show that the new approximation method converges at least linearly to the least fixpoint. Theorem 6.2 of [2] implies the following lemma about the convergence of Newton's method for MSPs, i.e., systems without maxima and minima.
Lemma 4. Let f be a feasible quadratic MSP. The sequence (τ
We emphasize that linear convergence is the worst case. In many practical examples, in particular if the matrix I − f ′ (µf ) is invertible, Newton's method converges exponentially. We mean by this that the number of accurate bits of the approximation grows exponentially in the number of iterations.
As a first step towards our main result for this section, we use Lemma 4 to show that our approximation method converges linearly whenever f is a max-MSPs. In this case we obtain the same convergence speed as for MSPs.
Lemma 5. Let f be a feasible max-MSP. Let
is non-empty and τ
f σ for all σ ∈ M and i ∈ N. Proof. Theorem 1 implies that there exists a ∨-strategy σ ∈ Σ such that µf σ = µf .
Thus M is non-empty. Let σ ∈ M . By induction on k Lemma 3 implies τ
Combining Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 we get linear convergence for max-MSPs:
n ) has at least i valid bits of µf for every i ∈ N.
A direct consequence of Lemma 5 is that the τ -sequence (τ
f σ ) converges exponentially for some σ ∈ Σ with µf σ = µf . This is in particular the case if the matrix I − (f σ ) ′ (µf ) is invertible. In order to extend this result to minmax-MSPs we state the following lemma which enables us to relate the sequence (τ
Lemma 6. Let f be a feasible min-max-MSP and m denote the number of strategies
There is a constant k ∈ N such that for all i ∈ N there exists some strategy π ∈ Π with µf = µf π and τ
We now present the main result of this section which states that our approximation method converges at least linearly also in the general case, i.e., for min-max-MSPs.
Theorem 3. Let f be a feasible quadratic min-max-MSP and m denote the number of strategies
has at least i valid bits of µf for every i ∈ N.
The upper bound on the convergence rate provided by Theorem 2 is by the factor m worse than the upper bound obtained for MSPs. Since m is the number of strategies π ∈ Π with µf π = µf , m is trivially bounded by |Π| but is usually much smaller. The
f ) converges exponentially whenever (τ
f π ) converges exponentially for every π with µf π = µf (see Appendix C). The latter condition is typically satisfied (see the discussion after Theorem 2).
In order to determine the approximate
. This can be done by using the strategy improvement algorithm from [8] . The algorithm iterates over ∨-strategies. For each strategy it solves a linear program or alternatively iterates over ∧-strategies. The number of ∨-strategies used by this algorithm is trivially bounded by the number of
. However, we do not know an example for which the algorithm considers more than linearly many strategies.
The ν-Method
The τ -method, presented in the previous section, uses strategy iteration over ∨-strategies to compute N f (y). This could be expensive, as there may be exponentially many ∨-strategies. Therefore, we derive an alternative generalization of Newton's method that in each step picks the currently most promising ∨-strategy directly, without strategy iteration.
Consider again a fixed feasible min-max-MSP f whose least fixpoint we want to approximate. Assume that y is some approximation of µf . Instead of applying N f to y, as the τ -method, we now choose a strategy σ ∈ Σ such that f (y) = f σ (y), and compute N f σ (y), where N f σ was defined in Section 4 as N f σ (y) := µ(L(f σ , y)∨y). In the following we write N σ instead of N f σ if f is understood.
Assume for a moment that f is a max-MSP and that there is a unique σ ∈ Σ such that f (y) = f σ (y). The approximant N σ (y) is the result of applying one iteration of Newton's method, because L(f σ , y) is not only a linearization of f σ , but the first order
In this sense, the ν-method is a more direct generalization of Newton's method than the τ -method. Formally, we define the ν-method by a sequence of approximates, the ν-sequence. 
Definition 2 (ν-sequence). A sequence (ν
The goal of this section is again to strengthen Proposition 2 towards quantitative convergence results for ν-sequences. To achieve this goal we again relate the convergence of ν-sequences to the convergence of Newton's method for MSPs. If f is an MSP, Lemma 4 allows to argue about the Newton operator N f when applied to approximates x ≤ µf . To transfer this result to min-max-MSPs f we need an invariant like
for ν-sequences. As a first step to such an invariant we further restrict the selection of the σ (k) . Roughly speaking, the strategy in a component i is only changed when it is immediate that component i has not yet reached its fixpoint.
Definition 3 (lazy strategy update). Let
is obtained from x and σ by a lazy strategy update if
by a lazy strategy update.
The key property of lazy ν-sequences is the following non-trivial invariant.
The following example shows that lazy strategy updates are essential to Lemma 7 even for max-MSPs.
Example 6. Consider the MSP f (x, y) = (
). However, the conclusion of Lemma 7 does not hold, because (
is not obtained by a lazy strategy update, as f 1 (ν (1) ) = ν
1 . ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 7 falls short of our subgoal to establish
, because Π \ Π * might be non-empty. In fact, we provide an example in Appendix B. f σπ .
Algorithm 1 lazy ν-method
procedure lazy-ν(f , k) assumes: f is a min-max-MSP returns:
is invertible for all σ ∈ Σ and π ∈ Π with µf σπ = µf , Newton's method converges exponentially. The following theorem captures the worst-case, in which the lazy ν-method still converges linearly. The following theorem is a direct consequence of Lemma 7 for the case where Π = Π * . It shows the second major advantage of the lazy ν-method, namely, that that the strategies σ (k) are meaningful in terms of games.
holds for all k ∈ N.
As (ν (k) ) converges to µf , the max-strategy σ (k) can be considered ǫ-optimal. In terms of games, Theorem 5 states that the strategy σ (k) guarantees the max-player an outcome of at least ν (k) . It is open whether an analogous theorem holds for the τ -method.
Application to the primaries example. We solved the equation system of Section 3 approximatively by performing 5 iterations of the lazy ν-method. Using Theorem 5 we found that Clinton can extinguish a problem (a) individual with a probability of at least X a = 0.492 by concentrating on her program and her "ready from day 1" message.
(More than 70 Kleene iterations would be needed to infer that X a is at least 0.49.) As ν (5) seems to solve above equation system quite well in the sense that f (ν
is small, we are pretty sure about Obama's optimal strategy: he should talk about Iraq. As ν
X1 > 0.38 and σ (2) maps f 1 to 0.3 + 0.7X 2 1 , Clinton's team can use Theorem 5 to infer that X a ≥ 0.38 by showing emotions and using her "ready from day 1" message.
Discussion
In order to compare our two methods in terms of convergence speed, assume that f denotes a feasible min-max-MSP. Since N f (x) ≥ N f σ (Lemma 3.5), it follows that τ
f holds for all i ∈ N. This means that the τ -method is as least as fast as the ν-method if one counts the number of approximation steps. Next, we construct an example which shows that the number of approximation steps needed by the lazy ν-method can be much larger than the respective number needed by the τ -method. It is parameterized with an arbitrary k ∈ N and given by f (x 1 , x 2 ) = x 2 ∧ 2, x We now compare our approaches with the tool PReMo [13] . PReMo employs 4 different techniques to approximate µf for min-max-MSPs f : It uses Newton's method only for MSPs without min or max. In this case both of our methods coincide with Newton's method. For min-max-MSPs, PReMo uses Kleene iteration, round-robin iteration (called Gauss-Seidel in [13] ), and an "optimistic" variant of Kleene which is not guaranteed to converge. In the following we compare our algorithms only with Kleene iteration, as our algorithms are guaranteed to converge and a round-robin step is not faster than n Kleene steps.
Our methods improve on Kleene iteration in the sense that κ (i) ≤ τ (i) , ν (i) holds for all i ∈ N, and our methods converge linearly, whereas Kleene iteration does not converge linearly in general. For example, consider the MSP g(x) = 1 2 x 2 + 1 2 with µg = 1. Kleene iteration needs exponentially many iterations for j bits [3] , whereas Newton's method gives exactly 1 bit per iteration. For the slightly modified MSPg(x) = g(x) ∧ 1 which has the same fixpoint, PReMo no longer uses Newton's method, asg contains a minimum. Our algorithms still produce exactly 1 bit per iteration.
In the case of linear min-max systems our methods compute the precise solution and not only an approximation. This applies, for example, to the max-linear system of [13] describing the expected time of termination of a nondeterministic variant of Quicksort. Notice that Kleene iteration does not compute the precise solution (except for trivial instances), even for linear MSPs without min or max.
We implemented our algorithms prototypically in Maple and ran them on the quadratic nonlinear min-max-MSP describing the termination probabilities of a recursive simple stochastic game. This game stems from the example suite of PReMo (rssg2.c) and we used PReMo to produce the equations. Both of our algorithms reached the least fixpoint after 2 iterations. So we could compute the precise µf and optimal strategies for both players, whereas PReMo computes only approximations of µf .
Conclusion
We have presented the first methods for approximatively computing the least fixpoint of min-max-MSPs, which are guaranteed to converge at least linearly. Both of them are generalizations of Newton's method. Whereas the τ -method converges faster in terms of number of approximation steps, one approximation step of the ν-method is cheaper. Furthermore, we have shown that the ν-method computes ǫ-optimal strategies for games. Whether such a result can also be established for the τ -method is still open. A direction for future research is to evaluate our methods in practice. In particular, the influence of imprecise computation through floating point arithmetic should be studied. It would also be desirable to find a bound on the "threshold" k f .
A Auxiliary Lemmas
In this appendix we introduce some additional concepts that are needed for the proofs (Appendix A.1), lay the ground for the proof of the fundamental Theorem 1 by exploiting the convexity properties of MSPs (Appendix A.2), and show a lemma on strategies analogous to Lemma 2 but for min-max-MLSs (Appendix A.3).
A.1 Notations and Basics
Let us introduce some additional concepts that are needed for the proofs.
Let I = {i 1 , . . . , i k } ⊆ {1, . . . , m} with i 1 < · · · < i k and x ∈ R n (resp. f : R n → R m ). We denote the vector (x i1 , . . . , x i k ) (resp. (f i1 , . . . , f i k )) by x I (resp. f I ). We write x ⊳ y iff x i < y i for all i = 1, . . . , n. W.l.o.g. we use the norm · 1 on R n which is defined by x 1 = |x 1 | + · · · + |x n |. We will omit the subscript. As usual, the set of power-series in the variables X and with coefficients from ⊓ ⊔ Before we state a technical lemma we introduce some notation. Let f ∈ R n [X] be a polynomial. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and y ∈ R, we write f [i/y] for the polynomial obtained from f by substituting the variable X i by the value y ∈ R and eliminating the i-th component of f . Thus,
is a function which maps values from R n−1 to values from R n−1 . Moreover, for I := {i 1 , . . . , i k } ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with i 1 < · · · < i k and y ∈ R k , we write f [I/y] for the polynomial i (0) can be considered as a monotone polynomial in the variable x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) . Moreover, we have
α ) i∈N is increasing for every α ∈ N k ; and 2. (c
In order to show the first statement, we consider the set R n−k [X J ] is a partial ordered set by setting
(Here, we consider X J is a vector of variables). If we evaluate the polynomial
This means: The monotone polynomial f [I/x] can be considered as a mapping from R n−k
Since all coefficients of f [I/x] are greater than or equal to 0 we get that f [I/x] is a monotone mapping on R n−k
Thus, we get the statement by induction on i, i.e., f [I/x](0) ≥ 0 and
. This implies the statement.
In order to show the second statement, assume for the sake of contradiction that (c
α ) i∈N is increasing and bounded, (c
Thus, f * is a monotone power-series which converges absolutely on
The following lemma in particular states that the first order Taylor approximation of an MSP f at y is an under-approximation of f for all x ≥ y.
Proof (of Lemma 13) . Observe that f is continuous differentiable on the convex set [a, b] and furthermore, since f
. Thus, we get the statement using theorem 13.3.2 from [12] .
⊓ ⊔
The following statement is implicitly contained in the proof of Theorem 2 in [4] . However, since we are not restricted to the case of 1-exit recursive simple stochastic games as in [4] , we need to generalize the statement slightly.
be a feasible MSP and {i}∪J = {1, . . . , n}. Let
Proof (of Lemma 14)
. Assume w.l.o.g. that i = 1. Let g : R ≥0 → R ≥0 be defined by
Note that by assumption and monotonicity of f 1
Furthermore, since g is the composition of two monotone power-series, g is also a monotone power-series. Let
We first show that x * 1 > x 1 . Suppose for the sake of contradiction
which is a contradiction to x
contradicting the assumption that y is a post-fixpoint of f .
⊓ ⊔
We generalize Lemma 14 as follows.
Proof (of Lemma 15). Let k := |I|. We proceed by induction on |I|. Let {i 1 , . . . , i k } :
Moreover,ŷ is a post-fixpoint off . By induction hypothesis it follows µf ≥x. Using the definition off andx, we get µ(
Moreover, f i1 (x) > x i1 and y ≥ x is a post-fixpoint of f . Thus we get µf ≥ x using lemma 14. ⊓ ⊔
A.3 Strategies for min-max-MLSs Lemma 16. Let f be a min-max-MLS. Then (1) µf
σ ≤ µf for every σ ∈ Σ; (2) µf π ≥ µf for every π ∈ Π; (3) µf π = µf for some π ∈ Π.
Proof (of Lemma 16).
Observe that, for σ ∈ Σ, µf is a post-fixpoint of f σ . Thus, Knaster-Tarski's theorem implies the first statement. Similar, the fact that, for π ∈ Π, µf π is a post-fixpoint of f implies the second statement. For the third statement observe that there exists some π ∈ Π such that µf is a fixpoint of f π . Thus µf π ≤ µf . Since µf π ≥ µf by assertion 2, we finally get µf = µf π . ⊓ ⊔
B Omitted Proofs
In this appendix we give the proofs that were missing. 
B.1 Omitted Proofs of
Proof (of Lemma 2) . Observe that, for σ ∈ Σ, µf is a post-fixpoint of f σ . Thus, Knaster-Tarski's theorem implies the first statement. Similar, the fact that, for π ∈ Π * , µf π is a post-fixpoint of f implies the second statement. For the third statement observe that there exists some π ∈ Π such that µf is a fixpoint of f π . Thus π ∈ Π * and µf π ≤ µf . Since µf π ≥ µf by assertion 2, we finally get µf = µf π . ⊓ ⊔ Theorem 1. Let f be a feasible max-MSP. Then µf σ = µf for some σ ∈ Σ.
Proof (of Theorem 1).
For the sake of contradiction assume that µf σ < µf for every ∨-strategy σ ∈ Σ. Let σ be any strategy and x := µf σ . Since x is a pre-fixpoint of f σ , x is also a pre-fixpoint of f . Since by assumption x < µf , there exists some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that x i < f i (x). Let I = {i} and J := {1, . . . , n} \ I. Let σ ′ be a strategy such that f
for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i}. Such a strategy must exist. We will apply Lemma 15. Observe that by construction f . Then:
Proof (of Lemma 3) . In order to show the first statement, let
. In order to show the second ≤-relation, observe that x * ≥ x and f
In order to show the second statement, let x = f (x) and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Assume that f i = j∈{1,...,k} f i,j where ∈ { , }. Then
In order to show the third assertion, let x ≤ y, y * := N f (y) and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Assume that f i = j∈{1,...,k} f i,j where ∈ { , }. It holds:
Thus y * is a post-fixpoint of L(f , x)∨x which implies, using Knaster-Tarski's fixpoint
. In order to show the fourth statement, let x * := N f (x). Assume that f i = j∈{1,...,k} f i,j where ∈ { , }. Then:
Since we have chosen an arbitrary i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have
In order to show the fifth statement, let σ ∈ Σ and x * := N f (x). We have to show that
Assume now that f i = j=1,...,k f i,j . Then f σ i = f i and thus there is nothing to show. Statement 6 can be shown analogously.
For statement 7 let l := L(f , x) ∨ x and x * := N f (x) = µl. Observe that there
Observe furthermore that there exists a ∧-strategy π ∈ Π f which corresponds to the ∧-strategy π
Proof (of Proposition 1).
Since by Lemma 3.1 N f (x) ≥ x for every x, (τ
f ) is monotonically increasing. We show by induction on k that µf ≥ τ
f . This implies the statement, since (κ () f ) converges to µf by lemma 1.2. Assume that this holds for k. Using Lemma 3 we get: Proof (of Lemma 4) . In [2] the authors rely on the additional pre-condition that the MSP is clean. This is important since the next approximate N f (τ (i) ) is defined using the inverse of the matrix f ′ (τ (i) )−I (I denotes the identity matrix). If the MSP is clean, then this inverse exists and thus N f (τ (i) ) is defined for all approximates τ (i) . Here we have avoided this problem by defining
which always exists. An MSP f which is not clean can be transformed into an "equivalent" clean MSP g [10, 2] . Then, for every k ∈ N, the approximate τ
f generated from our method is, beside extra components which are 0, equal to the approximate ν (k) g defined in [2] . Thus we can omit the pre-condition that f must be clean. ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 6. Let f be a feasible min-max-MSP and m denote the number of strategies π ∈ Π with µf = µf π . There is a constant k ∈ N such that for all i ∈ N there exists some strategy π ∈ Π with µf = µf π and τ
Notice that g is a min-MSP, because f σπ (y) ≥ y by assumption. Let
. In other words,
Here is a restatement of Proposition 2. 
Recall that, by definition of I, we have x I ⊳ f Proof (of Theorem 4) . Set k max = max{k f σπ | µf = µf σπ }, where the maximum ranges over the k f σπ from Lemma 4. Let i ∈ N. We have:
The last approximate has, by Lemma 4, at least i valid bits of µf σπ = µf . So we get the desired result by setting k f := k as + m · k max .
Here is a restatement of Lemma 9.
Lemma 9. Let g be a linear min-MSP such that g i = 0 whenever (µg) i = 0 for all components i. Then µg is the greatest vector x with x ≤ g(x).
Proof (of Lemma 9) . Let I denote the set of the components i with g i = 0. Define the MSP f := g[I/0]. Now we know by assumption that f is clean, i.e., µf ⊲ 0, and it suffices to show that µf is the greatest pre-fixpoint of f . Let y = µf . By Lemma 2 there exists a π ∈ Π with y = µf π . In particular we have y = f π (y). Assume for a contradiction that there exists a z ≤ y with z ≤ f (z). As f (z) ≤ f π (z), it follows z ≤ f π (z). Since y ⊲ 0, there is an ǫ > 0 such that x := y + ǫ(y − z) ⊲ 0. Notice that y ≤ x. Furthermore we have:
i.e., x is a post-fixpoint of f π . But y is the least fixpoint of f π , and by Knaster-Tarski's theorem, the least post-fixpoint. So we have y ≤ x which is a contradiction. ⊓ ⊔
B.4 Proof for the example of Section 6
We show that, for any given k ∈ N \ {0}, we can construct a min-max-MSP such that the τ -method needs only 2 whereas the lazy ν-method needs at least k approximation steps. In order to do so, let k ∈ N \ {0} and ǫ := 2 −2(k+1) > 0. Let f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) = x f ) ≥ f (2, 2 + ǫ) = (2, 4.25) we conclude that τ (2) f = (2, 4.25) = µf . Let us now consider the ν-method. There are two possible ∨-strategies σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ Σ f given by σ 1 (f 1 ∨ f 2 ) = f 1 and σ 2 (f 1 ∨ f 2 ) = f 2 . We show:
We proceed by induction on i ∈ N. The base case holds, since. ν
For the induction step assume that i ≥ 0. We have:
f σ 1 )) = (y, y) ⊤ where y is the least solution from R ≥0 of the equation
Thus, y is given by
This shows (13) . As a next subgoal, we show
Let i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We have 2 −2(i+1) ≥ 2 −2(k+1) = ǫ. 
